Today Hunter Biden's lawyers filed a Motion for Pretrial Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecum, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)(1), to Donald Trump, William Barr, Jeffrey Rosen, and Richard Donoghue. The proposed subpoenas demand documents relating to decisions involving the investigation or prosecution of Hunter Biden in both the Trump and Biden Administrations. The defense maintains that the documents are highly likely to be relevant to its contention that the Hunter Biden Indictment is an example of a constitutionally impermissible vindictive or selective prosecution. Defendants are entitled under the Sixth Amendment to present a defense and to compulsory production of witnesses and documents in aid of that right. Here is the motion. U.S. v. Hunter Biden – Defense Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecum Pursuant to Rule 17(c) and Memorandum in Support.
Category: News
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On Friday afternoon, November 2, 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted an administrative stay of Judge Chutkan's 10-17-23 Gag Order in U.S. v. Trump. The Court was careful to point out that, "[t]he purpose of this administrative stay is to give the court sufficient opportunity to consider the emergency motion for a stay pending appeal and should not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits of that motion." In other words, the Court issued an administrative stay while considering, on an expedited basis, Trump's Motion for a Stay of the Gag Order pending appeal of that Order. The granting of the administrative stay did not involve any analysis of the likelihood of Trump's ultimate success on the merits of the Gag Order. Trump's brief on the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal is due today, 11-8-23, as is the Joint Appendix. The Government's Response is due 11-14-23. Trump's Reply is due 11-17-23. Oral argument is set for 11-20-23.
Here is the Circuit Court's Friday Order Granting an Administrative Stay. U.S. v. Donald Trump – U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C. Order Granting Administrative Stay of Trump Gag Order.
Stay tuned for more.
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The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has finally fixed the glitch in its electronic filing system. Here is yesterday's U.S. v. Trump – Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Stay Gag Order Pending Appeal. Judge Chutkan also lifted her prior administrative stay of the Gag Order, so it is now in effect. She denied without prejudice the government's request to modify the Gag Order as unnecessary, even assuming it was procedurally proper. The defense maintained that the Gag Order could not be modified since the case was on appeal.
Former President Trump had filed his Reply in support of the Motion to Stay on Saturday, and Judge Chutkan discusses Trump's Reply in her Sunday Opinion and Order. Here is Trump's Reply: U.S. v. Trump – President Trump's Reply in Support of Motion for Stay of Gag Order Pending Appeal.
Here, for convenience purposes, is the 10-17-23 Trump Gag Order in DC Case.
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Former President Donald Trump appealed U.S. District Court Judge Tanya Chutkan’s October 17 Gag Order the day it was issued and asked Judge Chutkan on October 20 for a stay of the Gag Order pending appeal and an immediate administrative stay of the Gag Order while the Stay Motion was being briefed in her court. Judge Chutkan granted an administrative stay on October 20 and ordered the government to respond to Trump’s Stay Motion by October 25. Special Counsel Jack Smith filed his response in opposition to the stay last night. But Smith was able in his Response to complain about new Trump posts and comments that have occurred in the 5 days since the Gag Order was imposed and Smith now wants the stay lifted and the Order modified to make it even stronger. Here are former President Trump's Motion to Stay and the Government's Opposition.
U.S. v. Trump – President Trump's Motion For Stay Pending Appeal.
Download U.S. v. Trump – Government's Response in Opposition to Motion to Stay.
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When the affidavit on the warrant was released, albeit redacted, it was clear that this was a situation where the government asked for materials for the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) but received only some of the materials, and that a search was conducted to get the rest of the materials, although it remains to be seen whether they obtained everything initially requested. The Search Warrant referenced the Obstruction of Justice statute 18 U.S.C. 1519. (see here). As a backdrop to this search was the fact that there exists a Presidental Records Act that controls Presidential records. (44 U.S.C. 2201 et. seq.) So irrespective of the former President's claim that he declassified these documents (a mindboggling admission), they were still subject to be returned to the National Archives. (see here).
Now we see a court discussion as to whether these documents that he allegedly declassified are subject to executive privilege. Despite President Trump no longer being the executive, the court leaves that issue open for further legal argument (see here).
It is one thing to find that alleged attorney-client privilege material may be interspersed with folders marked classified information and/or personal clothing, and appoint a special master to keep the attorney-client material from anyone's view. Appointing a special master for potential attorney-client privileged material, whether it be the lawyer or the client is a better way to review attorney-client privileged material than a government filter or taint team. (see here)
It is hard to imagine that someone would have classified material, and would nevertheless allow that material to be left in an unsecured location amongst other material. We are not dealing with a teenager needing to clean their room – but rather the former top head of this country possessing what might be highly sensitive information. And it is good to see the judge allowing the classification review and/or intelligence assessment by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to continue, not impeded by her restraint of the government using other materials.
But the executive privilege claim discussed by the court is confusing me. On one hand the court is saying there might be privileged material and on the other hand former President Trump has stated that he declassified the material. Clearly, these are two different concepts, but is it privileged material or has it been declassified and should it be open to the public. If it is privileged material that was not turned over when the first request was made, then the Trump team should have been in court arguing to retain information as privileged material well before the search. If it was all declassified than why was it not turned over to the Archives upon the government's request. Will the former president really argue that all this alleged declassified material is now material subject to an executive privilege? And irrespective of whether it was declassified or it is executive privileged material, why was it not turned over under NARA.
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Peter Henning was an incredible writer, scholar, and teacher. Most of all to me – he was a good friend.
In November of 2004, Peter Henning and I started this WhiteCollarCrimeProfBlog. He moved on to later write the White Collar Watch for the NYTimes, but we continued to co-author many a book on criminal law, criminal procedure, and white collar crime. Whether it was a criminal law casebook, a criminal procedure treatise, or the hornbook on white collar crime, Peter was amazing. He understood the nuances in cases, the rationales of the prosecutors, and had a gift of writing quickly in highly complex areas of the law.
On the rules of law he and I seldom disagreed. On whether the prosecution or defense had the better argument, however, we often differed. When that happened, our rule was simple – let the reader hear both sides, but always make sure the representations were accurate.
I will miss Peter's humor, his writing, and his friendship. His family was his everything to him, so my heart goes out to them.
RIP Peter.
Wayne State Law School Announcement – here
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Here is the CNN story. The jury acquitted Holmes, the former CEO of blood-testing startup Theranos, on all 4 counts related to the alleged defrauding of patients. She was convicted on 4 counts related to defrauding of investors, including a conspiracy count. The jury hung on 3 additional investor fraud counts. There will be no retrial of the counts that the jury could not reach agreement on, because Holmes' ultimate sentence would not be affected by a guilty verdict on those counts. Moreover, under current Supreme Court case law, the trial court can (unfortunately) consider the government's evidence against Holmes on both the acquitted and hung counts in determining her sentence. The SEC long ago settled its case against Holmes without demanding an admission of wrongdoing on her part. Had she made such an admission there would have been no need for a criminal trial.
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The full United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit yesterday granted Judge Emmet Sullivan’s Motion for Rehearing En Banc, vacating a decision by one its three-judge panels, and will soon decide whether to grant General Michael Flynn’s Petition for a Writ of Mandamus against Judge Sullivan. Flynn seeks the Writ of Mandamus in order to force Judge Sullivan to immediately grant the Department of Justice’s May 7, 2020 Motion to Dismiss the criminal case against him, a motion consented to by Flynn. Regardless of the full Court’s ultimate ruling on the mandamus issue, DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss will have to be granted sooner or later under governing legal precedents. No federal appellate court has ever sustained a district court’s refusal to grant an unopposed government motion to dismiss an indictment.
There are two separate but related legal issues at stake before the Court of Appeals. First, does the law require Judge Sullivan to grant DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss in the absence of a grave constitutional issue, reducing Sullivan’s function to a ministerial one? Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) requires “leave of court” when the government moves to dismiss an indictment, but an abundance of federal case law holds that the district court’s role is in fact quite limited when the government moves to dismiss a criminal case and the defendant consents. Second, is mandamus the appropriate remedy for Flynn given that Judge Sullivan has yet to rule on DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss? Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, typically reserved for situations where the remedy provided at law is inadequate. Judge Sullivan had not yet ruled on DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss when Flynn filed his Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. Why didn’t Flynn just wait for Judge Sullivan to rule and for DOJ to appeal Sullivan’s order if he denied the motion?
The DOJ has argued that Judge Sullivan’s: 1) appointment of retired federal judge John Gleeson as an amicus, or friend of the court, for the specific purpose of opposing DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss; and 2) Judge Sullivan’s indication that he intends to examine closely DOJ’s motives in filing the Motion to Dismiss, will themselves be an improper intrusion into Executive Branch functions, in violation of Separation of Powers. Flynn has argued that these same factors, along with Sullivan’s setting of a drawn out briefing schedule, harms him financially and reputationally by delaying the immediate relief he is entitled to.
What is likely to happen next?
Argument before the Court sitting En Banc has been set for August 11, but the Court wants no further briefing. The Court’s Order states that the parties “should be prepared to address whether there are ‘no other adequate means to attain the relief’ desired. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004).” Cheney is a key Supreme Court case involving the intersection of Separation of Powers and Mandamus case law. In other words, the key issue before the full D.C. Circuit is whether mandamus is premature. Should Judge Sullivan have been allowed to hold a hearing and make a ruling before Flynn went to a higher court seeking mandamus relief or did the very mechanisms set in place by Sullivan create an improper intrusion into Executive Branch matters and a harmful delay in the relief to which Flynn was entitled?
Even if the Court of Appeals ultimately holds that mandamus is premature, expect the full Court to set clear standards as to what Judge Sullivan can and cannot do (and how long he can take) in ruling on DOJ’s Motion to Dismiss. And make no mistake about it. The DOJ’s Motion will ultimately be granted.
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One of the ironies of high-profile, criminal investigations of public officials, particularly Special and Independent Counsel investigations, is the outrage expressed by certain segments of the populace upon discovering the existence of very common law enforcement techniques. Hence the outrage among President Clinton's supporters when they learned that Linda Tripp secretly tape-recorded her "best friend" Monica Lewinsky at the behest of Ken Starr's prosecutors. Hence the outrage, among Trump's supporters, when they discovered that FBI officials wanted to catch General Flynn in a lie and threatened his son with prosecution in order to coerce a guilty plea. "That happens all the time," say the know-it-all criminal law cognoscenti who fellow-travel with one side or another, as well as their minions who parrot the party line to the faithful. Except in the case of Judge Starr. Almost nobody was on our side, parroting our points. Except the courts. Most of the time. But I digress.
Our subject today is a nasty little paragraph inserted into General Flynn's plea agreement by Bob Mueller's staff. I first started noticing this provision 5 or 6 years ago in some of the plea offers that came my way, depending on which U.S. Attorney's Office I was dealing with at the time. It has shown up more often since then, but is far from universal. It can be found in most or all of the Mueller team's plea agreements. It is typically found in Paragraph 9(F) within the Waivers section. It states as follows: "Your client agrees to waive all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representative, to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case, including and without any limitation any records that may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 552, or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 552(a), for the duration of the Special Counsel's Investigation." The limiting of the waiver to the duration of the investigation is not a feature I have previously encountered.
Although the waiver does not mention Brady material on its face, it clearly applies to requests for exculpatory records. (As I noted here recently, it was after General Flynn’s case was transferred to Judge Sullivan’s court, and Sullivan entered his broad standing Brady Order, that Mueller’s team appears to have provided voluminous additional discovery to Flynn’s lawyers.) Prosecutors have a constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory information to the defense even if defense counsel does not request it. But case law holds that more detailed, specific defense requests create a greater prosecutorial obligation. In my view, this paragraph forces defense counsel to breach his or her ethical duties to the client to vigorously demand Brady material as well as mitigating information required under state ethical rules and the McDade Amendment. The Department of Justice should put a stop to this and prohibit all such provisions from being part of its plea agreements. This includes FOIA requests, which serve to ensure, post-judgment, that the government's Brady obligations have been met. Here is the Flynn Plea Agreement.
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Reply briefs were filed yesterday in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in In re: Michael T. Flynn. Oral arguments are set for tomorrow morning, June 12. Attached here are; Flynn's Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus; the D.C. Circuit's highly unusual May 21, 2020 Order requiring Judge Emmet Sullivan to respond to the Petition's argument that Sullivan is obliged to grant DOJ's Motion to Dismiss the Flynn Indictment with prejudice; Judge Sullivan's June 1, 2020 Brief in Response to the Court of Appeals Order; Flynn's June 10 Reply Brief; DOJ's June 10 Reply Brief; and a further Response Brief on behalf of Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. Enjoy!
In re Micheal Flynn Petition for a Writ of Mandamus
Brief for Judge Emmet Sullivan in Response to DC Circuit Court Order
DOJ DC Circuit Reply to Sullivan Response on Flynn Petition for Mandamus
Flynn DC Circuit Reply to Sullivan Response on Flynn Petition for Mandamus
Judge Emmet Sullivan's 6-10-2020 Response to the other briefs
